Dhaka–Delhi relations, long characterized by uneasy cooperation punctuated by periodic flare-ups, have entered a fragile phase. Recent developments—violent protests in Bangladesh and India, the suspension of visa services, and threats directed at Bangladeshi diplomats in New Delhi—have eroded bilateral trust at a moment of political transition. If mishandled, this deterioration risks fueling communal polarization, paralyzing people-to-people ties, and unsettling the wider eastern South Asian region.

It is against this backdrop that Tarique Rahman has returned to Bangladesh at a time when political authority in Dhaka and established diplomatic routines are simultaneously in flux. As leader of the country’s largest political party, his physical return into domestic politics ahead of the February national election alters the political landscape in meaningful ways. With the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus and New Delhi signaling readiness to engage with an elected leadership in Dhaka, Rahman’s public emphasis on “Bangladesh first,” coupled with recognition of India’s historical and strategic importance, creates a narrow but consequential window for pragmatic re-engagement between Dhaka and Delhi.

Historical Backdrop

The trajectory of Dhaka–Delhi relations remains inseparable from the legacy of 1971. India’s decisive role in Bangladesh’s Liberation War established a shared historical foundation, but it also embedded a durable asymmetry in the relationship, rooted not only in power differentials, but also in geography, security interdependence, and historical sequencing. In Bangladesh, India has been perceived simultaneously as liberator and dominant neighbor—an ambivalence that continues to shape political discourse, public sentiment, and diplomatic expectations.

In the decades that followed, bilateral relations oscillated between cooperation and mistrust, often reflecting domestic political shifts in Dhaka. Under Sheikh Hasina, the Awami League aligned Bangladesh closely with India’s strategic priorities. Cooperation on counterterrorism, connectivity, and regional integration reassured New Delhi and lent predictability to the relationship. This alignment also generated domestic unease, as critics argued that strategic alignment sometimes constrained Bangladesh’s policy autonomy and narrowed its foreign policy options.

The recent political transition unsettled this equilibrium. New leadership under Muhammad Yunus and Dhaka’s efforts to diversify external partnerships were interpreted in some quarters as signs of strategic recalibration. More fundamentally, the transition exposed a structural vulnerability: bilateral stability had often rested on personalized political trust rather than institutional depth. It is within this institutional vacuum that recent shocks—symbolic, political, and security-related—have escalated more quickly than they otherwise might have.

The Present Crisis

The killing of Sharif Osman Bin Hadi served as the immediate catalyst for the current rupture. Although the incident was domestic in origin, its rapid political framing—through street mobilization and social media amplification—transformed it into a bilateral stressor.  Nationwide protests followed, and in segments of the public sphere these mobilizations quickly adopted explicitly anti-India themes. What began as an internal political shock thus spilled across the border, illustrating how fragile domestic events can be externalized into foreign-policy pressure points.

Diplomatic responses unfolded in quick succession. Bangladesh suspended consular and visa services in New Delhi, while Indian visa centers in Dhaka and Chattogram were temporarily closed. Administratively routine, these measures carried disproportionate symbolic impact. By interrupting the everyday movement of students, patients, traders, and families, they weakened the informal social and economic linkages that often function as stabilizing buffers during periods of diplomatic strain.

The crisis deepened further when activists breached the diplomatic zone in New Delhi and issued threats against the Bangladeshi High Commissioner. This episode raised serious concerns about the protection of foreign missions and reinforced perceptions in Dhaka that communal actors were increasingly shaping the bilateral atmosphere. At the same time, a parliamentary committee in India characterized Bangladesh as a strategic challenge since 1971.  In Dhaka, this hardened perceptions that Bangladesh was being treated less as a sovereign partner undergoing political transition and more as a security problem to be managed.

It is into this fraught environment that Tarique Rahman’s return has occurred. As leader of the largest political party, his presence is politically consequential in the run-up to the February election. His public posture—emphasizing national interest, moderation, and restraint—alters the domestic incentives that shape foreign-policy rhetoric and creates space for more interest-based, pragmatic engagement.

BNP’s Repositioning 

The BNP’s recent effort to project itself as a liberal democratic force—explicitly distancing the party from right-wing communal politics—marks a notable shift in its domestic and international positioning. By foregrounding pluralism, minority protection, rule of law, and democratic norms, the party seeks to recalibrate the political incentives that previously rewarded identity-based mobilization.

This repositioning carries direct implications for Dhaka–Delhi relations. A BNP leadership that publicly rejects communal mobilization reduces the domestic payoff of framing bilateral disputes in religious terms. That shift lowers the risk that isolated incidents—border tensions, diplomatic slights, or localized violence—are transformed into broader Hindu–Muslim confrontations with bilateral repercussions.

By emphasizing minority rights and pluralism, the BNP can also offer more credible reassurance to domestic minorities and international partners. This credibility helps counter narratives portraying Bangladesh as hostile to particular communities and reduces pressure on New Delhi to respond through identity-driven diplomacy. In this sense, the party’s stated orientation makes a more measured, interest-based engagement with India politically feasible.

At the same time, this repositioning should not be overstated. Rahman’s return is a domestic political development, not an immediate policy shift. The election outcome will determine the mandate of the next government. For now, his re-emergence matters because it reshapes incentives, influences public discourse, and reframes the terms under which bilateral engagement may unfold after the election. Rahman’s re‑emergence embodies this repositioning, reinforcing the BNP’s attempt to frame itself as a pluralist alternative.

Structural Interdependence

Despite current tensions, Bangladesh–India relations are defined not only by asymmetry but by deep structural interdependence. This interdependence is less transactional than organic—produced by geography, history, and dense social linkages rather than diplomatic design alone. Geography makes cooperation unavoidable: shared rivers, a long and porous border, and mutual needs for energy, transit, and security bind the two states. Economic ties—trade, supply chains, and connectivity—create strong incentives against prolonged rupture. Cultural continuities and cross-border kinship further constrain the political feasibility of sustained disengagement.

Institutionalizing cooperation is therefore not a diplomatic luxury but a strategic necessity. When domestic politics reward pluralism and governance, and when both capitals maintain open channels of communication, the bilateral relationship can be stabilized on a rules-based foundation that delivers tangible benefits to citizens on both sides.

Conditional Opening

Comparative experience suggests that neighbors with fraught histories can convert tension into cooperation when political actors prioritize institutions over identity politics. Tarique Rahman’s return—taking place ahead of the February election, with the Yunus government currently in office and Rahman leading the largest opposition party—constitutes a significant domestic development with external resonance. His public emphasis on putting Bangladesh first, combined with recognition of the historic Bangladesh–India relationship, creates a conditional opening for pragmatic re-engagement centered on restoring routines of dialogue, insulating diplomacy from identity politics, and rebuilding confidence through incremental cooperation. Whether this opening translates into sustained improvement in Dhaka–Delhi relations will depend on how political incentives, public discourse, and diplomatic channels evolve in the coming weeks. 

For now, Rahman’s return is a consequential fact: it reshapes domestic dynamics and reframes the bilateral conversation at a critical moment in Bangladesh’s political calendar. If New Delhi reciprocates with measured outreach, this moment can be converted into durable, institutionalized cooperation.

(The author is Professor and Chair of the Department of Economics, International University of Business Agriculture and Technology (IUBAT), Dhaka. His research focuses on regional trade, sustainable development, and South Asian economic cooperation. Views expressed are personal. He can be reached at golam.grasul@gmail.com)