It’s heartening to see that China has resumed the pilgrimage of Indian pilgrims to the sacred Mount Kailash and Lake Manasarovar in Southwest China’s Xizang Autonomous Region this year after a five-year break, and India has restarted the issuance of tourist visas to Chinese citizens suspended since 2020. Recently, several direct flights between the two countries have been restored. This development is expected to strengthen exchanges in people-to-people fields, as well as in trade, culture, and other areas.
Despite China's might and backing, Gyeltsen Norbu has lacked legitimacy and following among Tibetans and Tibetan Buddhists elsewhere, and many suspect the 15th Dalai Lama appointed by Beijing will suffer the same fate. The Dalai Lama has emphasised that China must reach a resolution on the Tibetan question during his lifetime, and many fear that without his moral authority, no solution will have widespread acceptance among the Tibetan people.
In reality not much has changed, the two sides lack a clear understanding of each other and misperception, nationalism and overall strategic mistrust have become the driving force. Even after much talk of building mutual understanding, in reality the gap continues not only among the governments but also among the people. In November 2025 Prema Wangjom Thongdok, a UK-based Indian woman from Arunachal Pradesh was harassed at Shanghai airport on her way to Japan. As per reports, Chinese officials claimed that, “Arunachal is not a part of India” and that she “should apply for a Chinese passport” as she was Chinese and not Indian.
The evolving Russia–India–China trilateral relationship presents a growing challenge to the United States and its aligned economies. More importantly, it represents a strategic opportunity for the three countries to coordinate policies, counter external economic coercion, and assert greater autonomy in pursuit of national interests. Putin’s visit to India thus goes beyond symbolism. It reflects a broader realignment in global power equations
As China continues to invest beyond what its economy can absorb, unproductive spending—much of it debt-financed—has expanded far faster than GDP. A decade ago, total debt was about twice the size of the economy; now it is roughly triple. The debt-to-GDP ratio has reached around 300 percent, alarmingly high for a developing economy.
While China’s model may not be directly replicable in a democratic setup like India, the emphasis it places on institutional adaptability, long-term strategic planning, and coordinated governance holds enduring relevance. India’s path will be different—but learning from China’s successes and failures can help shape a more inclusive, resilient, and forward-looking developmental trajectory.
Open war with India is not in China’s interest. It would jeopardize its Belt and Road Initiative, alienate global markets, and push India closer to the United States and other like-minded partners. Moreover, the Himalayan terrain offers no guarantee of quick victory. Still, China might employ limited conflicts or sudden skirmishes to test India’s resolve, create psychological pressure, or distract from internal challenges.
China’s Myanmar policy highlights a core strategic contradiction. While Beijing positions itself as a champion of peace, development, and regional connectivity, yet its explicit support for the military regime entrenches coercive rule to safeguard its strategic and economic interests.
Strategically, the display went beyond the immediate region. The unveiling of long-range nuclear platforms and hypersonic missiles positioned China as a peer competitor to the United States in global deterrence. No longer confined to regional defense, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) signaled its readiness to project power across continents.
The debate in Delhi will inevitably ask whether engagement through the SCO dilutes India’s other partnerships or rewards China without resolving the frontier. That binary misses the point. The right question is: can we turn multilateral statements into Indian payrolls while holding our security lines? The answer is yes, if we focus on execution.
While Wang Yi’s India visit and PM Modi’s upcoming China visit may signal a degree of creeping normalcy at the bilateral level, Beijing’s expanding footprint in South Asia is set to intensify regional competition, requiring careful assessment of its implications for the overall India-China relationship
Over the past decade, India’s strategic landscape has grown increasingly complex. Beijing has not diluted its consistent strategy of constraining India. Whether through deepening ties with Pakistan, or expanding influence in India’s periphery, China’s approach remains adversarial. Beijing’s assertive regional posture underscores the urgency for India to rethink both its economic and security policies.
What began with a coup in 2021 has devolved into a theater for China’s energy security, India’s border anxieties, Russia’s arms sales, and America’s China strategy. Each external actor pursues its narrow interests; none has the incentive to restore genuine stability. The losers, inevitably, are Myanmar’s people.
Chinese emperors, especially those of the Manchu-led Qing Dynasty, recognized that control over Tibetan Buddhism offered a powerful form of soft power. By leveraging religious authority, they could exert indirect political influence over Buddhist populations beyond China's borders.
Development diplomacy remains India’s strongest soft-power tool in the Indian Ocean. The contrast between India’s low-interest, grant-based infrastructure projects and China’s debt-heavy Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has not gone unnoticed. The Maldivian pivot back to India is partly driven by this contras
It risks turning a bilateral infrastructure issue into a trilateral diplomatic flashpoint, where India would have to thereafter balance its upstream anxieties with downstream responsibilities. In this context, Beijing’s growing hydrological footprint is not only being viewed as a strategic challenge in New Delhi, but also as a potential disruptor of its regional diplomacy in South Asia.
The broader strategic ramifications of the India–UK FTA are profound. It strengthens bilateral cooperation in areas such as defence, technology, renewable energy, and education, reinforcing both countries’ strategic footprints in the Indo-Pacific region.
China’s presence in South Asia has expanded considerably since the launch of the BRI in 2013. Beyond trade and infrastructure, it has emerged as a provider of military hardware and a key influencer in education, media, and policy discourse. China's outreach in smaller South Asian countries is multifaceted, ranging from party-to-party diplomacy to soft power tools like Buddhist cultural ties and influence operations.
In a media interview, Khandu strongly refuted Beijing’s territorial claims and emphasized Arunachal’s historical relationship with Tibet, a nation forcibly occupied by China in the 1950s. He pointed out that Arunachal Pradesh shares roughly 1,200 km of border with Tibet, around 100 km with Bhutan, and 550 km with Myanmar. His remarks were a pointed rebuttal to China’s repeated claims over Arunachal Pradesh, including renaming it as “Zangnan” or “South Tibet.”
