The nature of political violence in India has both temporal and spatial dynamics : first not limited to only during elections but can happen anytime which has the innate capacity to be manipulated for political interests. Second, the overlapping nature of the violence with crimes which establishes that the motive is not limited to winning or influencing elections alone (which is a long term objective). Achieving other political objectives also become significant – mobilising of communities, legitimising power dynamics of social groups, authorising culture of fear and construction of shared narratives to rally crowds.

Most incidences of violence in India are political in nature even if it originally began as a social conflict or religious clashes or caste violence. This implies that disparate events of violence have been instigated and used by political actors for mobilisation and positive political/electoral outcome. These incidents may not have emanated primarily to achieve political agenda but eventually became as such due to the overlapping nature of social, criminal and political institutions of the country. 

For example, two different caste communities fighting over the use of the local water body. One community is the upper caste and the other is lower caste. Eventually it is the political party supporting each of the community that gets involved and subsequently depending upon who is more powerful in the local power dynamics that the functioning of the administration also interferes accordingly. Conditional upon who eventually solves the matter in its favour, mobilisation of communities in favour of that political party occurs. This has long term consequences in the prologue to the election other than demonstrating the social might and status of communities in everyday realities. Ostensibly this might appear to be a caste related violence or communal in nature which is definitely the case but putting it in watertight compartmentalisation would overlook the interconnecting dynamics that forms the larger oeuvre of political violence in the country.

A combination of cultural violence by Galtung “any aspect of culture that can be used to legitimise violence” and symbolic violence by Bourdieu, “contemporary social hierarchies and social inequality, as well as the suffering that they cause, are produced and maintained less  by physical force than by forms of symbolic domination” – the spatial dimension of political violence expands encompassing heterogeneity. The political violence in India manipulates already existing ‘unequal’ cultures and symbols of the society to construct a political narrative that has both the temporal and spatial advantages. Therefore, ‘everything social is political.’ Or at least can be construed as such for political legitimacy in societies like India where domination is an essential ingredient of establishing oneself as a powerful actor both culturally as well as socially.

Criminalisation of political spaces

An unequal social context is already in existence which is vulnerable to power manipulation – be it social or political. The overlapping of social and political in the violence that emanates from such unequal structures fails to maintain its autonomy as particularly social or particularly political. Such a condition makes it conducive for multiple actors to use the violence for vested interests. In politics this is primarily evident to fulfil purposes of elections and mobilisation.

For example it is not just that the criminal actors are acting on behalf of the politicians (which is also the case) but the politicians themselves are criminal actors which in a way compounds the dynamics of the multiple actors involved in a violent event. Below there are two data released by Association of Democratic Reforms (ADR) during the 2024 elections:

Source: Association of Democratic Reforms

44% of sitting MPs have criminal charges against them. It also states that most of them are concentrated in the states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Himachal Pradesh. Out of these 44%, 5% are billionaires whose wealth exceeded 100 crores. In a new report released on August 21st, ADR and New Election Watch (NEW) stated that 151 elected Members of Parliament (MP) and Members of Legislative Assembly (MLA) have declared cases of crimes against women of which 16 are sitting MPs and 135 are sitting MLAs.

Money is an integral part which ensures criminalisation of the political space remains dominated by many such non-state actors without much criticism and conflict. Corruption and the flow of money into politics, therefore, becomes codependent enabling a seamless structure that is vulnerable to uncontrolled hegemony and unlawful domination. And because of these interconnected power dynamics the criminalisation of the political space ensures additional authority to commit the crimes without facing consequences. Such co-dependence creates a conducive space for reiteration of such actions and its continuous inclusion in the political processes to achieve positive electoral outcomes on one hand and unhindered unlawful activities on the other.

Regional dynamics and political violence in West Bengal.

I shall briefly talk about political violence and its nature in the state of West Bengal (WB) to highlight the regional dynamics in the debate. The reason for highlighting the case is: first I belong to the state and am acutely aware of its nature and unfolding from close quarters. Second, the primary actors involved in the violence are political agents thereby making it unnecessary to delve into detail in the social dynamics and its overlapping. The political violence in the state does not quite have cross-cutting and intersectional parameters of social identities through which the actors need to be additionally analysed for their role in violent activities. Their primary identity in such settings is political and no other aspects of ‘culture’ and ‘symbols’ are evident aspects of political violence which is mostly prevalent in other states.

The analysis of this case might appear to be negating the argument about social overlapping in criminal politics in the country, it simultaneously throws light on the federal and coalition configurations in analysing the plethora of violence thereby reinforcing the debate on contextualising the political violence and considering its myriad proxies in varied regions.

The intensity of the violence is also determined by factors such as if the state and national governments are the same and if the state government is an ally or not an ally of the centre (may not necessarily be part of the national coalition). This also impacts the manner in which crimes are reported, recorded and its data released. In spite of that WB has consistently witnessed regular political violence which is not limited to during election time. The scale and nature of violence also depend upon at which level is the election held – Panchayat/municipality, state assembly or general election.

WB has witnessed successive violence with increased intensity over the decades as compared to most other states. The recent 2024 general election was held in seven phases in the state which demonstrates the inability of the security forces to maintain law and order if conducted across the states in a single phase.

WB since 1947 has been ruled by three political parties – Indian National Congress (INC 1947-1977 with some brief period of exceptions)[1] ; 1977-2011 by Left Front government (LF) primarily led by Communist Party of India (Marxist) [CPI(M)][2] and 2011 – current by All India Trinamool Congress (AITMC or TMC).

INC was a liberation national party which had formed government both at the centre and in various states in the post- independence phase. Various factions within LF formed the coalition and have formed governments in three states of India – WB, Tripura and Kerala (the coalitions varied). While TMC was a faction carved out of INC and mainly arose as an opposition to left front rule in WB. INC and CPI(M) are national parties while TMC is a regional party. [3]

Source: Understanding the Unique Nature of Political Violence in Bengal (orfonline.org)

According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), the state recorded 3,338 incidents of political violence, including political murders, between 2016 and July 2023, One of the prime reasons is the economic nature of the political system prevalent in the state. Most violence is primarily witnessed in the rural areas. One of the prime reasons being the power and clout of the Panchayat Raj Institutions (PRIs)[4]. WB is the select few states in which PRIs are very active and strong. This was an initiative led by the LF government which came riding on the empowerment of the peasants and the working class. Therefore strengthening of the PRIs was the one promise that they fulfilled. However its ‘unanticipated consequence’ (Merton, 1936) was the flow of economic resources for development of local areas. Controlling over such resources became the battleground of the political parties who were primarily in power. For those who were not, the future control over resources and the immense economic and political clout that comes along with such positions of authority became the ultimate source behind the violence.

Clientelism is yet another nature of the polity in Bengal that drives the violence in the state. Control over the informal sector of the economy in a semi-legal environment. Distribution and collection over resources like coal, sand and stone mining create an ideal situation of rent seeking and corruption, some of the spoils of which are distributed across multiple levels of party cadres. Getting hold of such resources for economic and political domination in an otherwise economically poor state creates a conducive atmosphere for such acts of repeated violence in the state. Most of the time the party workers are unemployed full time with no regular sources of stable income making such acts of economic corruption a necessity source of livelihood. This process creates some sort of permanent dependence between the party workers and the party. This has been further exacerbated by the TMC which has casually coalesced the concept of pro-poor welfare benefits into some sort of clientelism where people are voting for the party in exchange of the monthly financial benefits distributed to the poor through formal channels under the guise of financial inclusion and empowerment of the economically poor. However what it actually is doing is creating a permanent dependence to ensure uninterrupted ruling rights through a system of patron-client relationships.

Another important facet of such violence is the affinity and identity based on party lines which Dwaipayan Bhattacharyya refers to as ‘party society’. It is a specific type of political society where political identity transcends caste, religion and ethnicity. Even the most personal of the problems would be resolved by going through party channels. And this was because the party was the symbol of moral guardians both in public and private lives of the people. This kind of system became particularly active during the LF rule and subsequent political party, the TMC had to adhere to such informal norms to remain acceptable.

Therefore the conundrum is despite the seemingly political stability of the governments (owing to its long term rules) what drives the regular political violence in the state. And that is why even a strong incumbent engages in political violence. However my aim here is not to answer this question other than using it as a plausible source of articulating the rationale behind the peculiar nature of WB violence which is different from other states.

Is there any solution?

As both the processes of criminalisation of politics and politicisation of crimes enjoy safe shelter in Indian politics over the decades, the political system becomes its most potent victim and fear its weapon. While it is not easy to challenge or uproot this malady altogether, tiny steps towards its plausible cure need to be adopted. Active role of institutions like a more vigilant media and the Election Commission and political education among the general voters could become key in addressing this.

(The writer is a Ph.D. in political science from University of Bonn, Germany, author and founder Green Zeit. Views are personal. She can be reached at mail.suparnabanerjee@gmail.com) 

[1] 1967-69 by Bangla Congress; 1970 - and 71-72 -President’s rule.

[2] Primarily four political parties with leftist leanings – Communist party of India (Marxist), Communist Party of India, All India Forward Bloc and Revolutionary Socialist Party.

[3] The criteria to be declared a national party by the Election Commission of India are:

i.                     party wins 2% seats (11 seats) in the Lok Sabha from atleast three different states.

ii.                   At a general election to Lok Sabha or Legislative Assembly, the party polls six per cent of votes in any four or more states and in addition it wins four Lok Sabha seats.

iii.                 The party gets recognition as a state party in four states.

[4] A system of local self-government in rural areas. It consist of three layers: Gram Panchayat at the village, Panchayat Samiti at the block level and Zilla Parishad at the district level. It was introduced as part of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992.