The Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS), also known as Daesh, officially declared the establishment of its offshoot, the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISK-P), in the South Asia region in 2015. Since ISK-P began its activities in Afghanistan, the Taliban have declared their opposition to the Islamic State and instructed their fighters to combat Islamic State and kill their leaders and fighters. Historically, the differences between the Taliban and ISIS did not start with the establishment of ISK-P. In fact, the difference between the Taliban and the Islamic State predates ISK-P’s presence in Afghanistan, dating back to when the Islamic State controlled large parts of Iraq and Syria. At that time, the first caliph of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, referred to the late Emir of the Taliban, Mullah Mohammad Omar, as a warlord, illiterate, and an insignificant figure. He also criticized him as someone lacking spirituality and political vision.

the Taliban and the Islamic State share similar ideologies and strategies, such as being influenced by Wahhabism and Salafism, establishment of a caliphate-style government, jihad against non-Muslims, and the imposition of Sharia law. Despite their similar ideology and strategy they dislike each other. Indeed their rivalry stems not from differences in their interpretation of Islam or types of government but rather from competition over resources, validation, and leadership supremacy. The Taliban believe their leader is the only rightful Emir-ul-Momineen (Commander of the Faithful) with the legitimacy to lead the Muslim Ummah (Nation). Therefore, they consider it mandatory for other Islamist groups to pledge allegiance to the Emir of the Taliban. Daesh holds the same belief, claiming that their caliph is the rightful leader who should be accepted as the caliph of the entire Muslim Ummah.

These issues have made the Taliban and ISK-P sworn enemies. Another notable claim by the Taliban is their rejection of Salafi ideology, asserting that they follow Hanafi Islam and have no connection to the radical Salafi movement. However, in contrast to their claims, the Taliban's methods of governance and interpretation of Sharia are closely aligned with Wahhabism and Salafism. The Hanafi school of Islam is traditionally known for its more moderate and anti-radical interpretation of Islamic teachings.

Internecine battles in Afghanistan

In light of this, when the Taliban seized power in August 2021, observers in Afghanistan viewed ISK-P as the main challenger to Taliban rule. Since then, ISK-P has carried out multiple suicide attacks in Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and Badakhshan provinces, and has targeted Taliban leaders, such as Daud Muzamil, the Taliban governor of Balkh Province. In response, the Taliban launched search operations against ISK-P members in eastern provinces like Nangarhar and Kunar. During these operations, the Taliban killed several individuals suspected of having ties to ISK-P. However, there are claims that many of those killed were not ISK-P members, but rather former members of the Afghanistan security forces, executed under the pretense of being ISK-P affiliates. Additionally, the Taliban have conducted operations in other parts of the country, including Herat, Kandahar, Parwan, Kabul, and Balkh provinces. It is believed that in these operations, the Taliban targeted members of the National Resistance Forces (NRF), the primary anti-Taliban group, under the pretext of fighting ISK-P. Overall, there is a widespread belief that the Taliban are using ISK-P as a pretext to suppress former members of the Afghanistan security forces and the NRF.

After conducting such operations, the Taliban claimed they had eliminated Daesh in Afghanistan. In contrast to their claim, ISK-P has expanded its area of activity across Afghanistan and improved its operational capabilities compared to the pre-Taliban period. According to international security agencies, ISK-P’s operational capacity has increased. The latest UN Security Council report confirms this. Recently, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) also expressed concerns about Daesh’s activities in the northern part of the country and reported that ISK-P has more than 5,000 fighters in the northeastern provinces alone.

Taliban, ISK-P use each other

Despite their rivalry, the Taliban and ISK-P see opportunities in each other. ISK-P views Afghanistan under Taliban rule as a safe haven for its leaders, recruits, and fighters to hide and plan terrorist activities. Conversely, the Taliban believe that the global threat posed by the Islamic State could help them align with the international community and gain political and financial support under the pretext of fighting ISK-P. Currently, the Taliban receive substantial financial aid from various countries, claiming to counter ISK-P. This strategy has proven effective in helping the Taliban consolidate power.

However, the reality is that the Taliban lack the capacity to eradicate ISK-P from Afghanistan, and ISK-P has no plans to capture territory from the Taliban. Since their defeat in the Middle East, ISK-P’s has learned its lessons and changed its strategy. They understand that capturing territory would provoke a strong response from regional and global powers, which would not only weaken ISK-P but also strengthen the Taliban. ISK-P’s focus is on using Afghanistan as a hub for its leaders, cadets, and fighters, allowing them to travel through the region and plan terror attacks beyond Afghanistan.

Although the relationship between Daesh and the Taliban is characterized by rivalry, both Daesh and the Taliban perceive each other as an opportunity rather than a threat. 

World should reconsider Afghan policy 

The region and the world should reconsider their policies toward Afghanistan and the Taliban. They must assist the Afghanistan people in forming a legitimate government and establish professional security forces. The Taliban are not a trustworthy partner in the fight against terrorism. Instead, the region and the world need a reliable ally, and the people of Afghanistan are the only dependable partner. They proved this from 2001 to 2021, until the world abandoned them. 

Over 65,000 Afghan security force personnel sacrificed their lives to protect the world from terror and terrorism. Their sacrifice should be admired, and they should be given another chance.

(The author is a Ph.D Scholar, Department of Defence and National Security Studies, Panjab University, Chandigarh. Views are personal. He can be contacted at zahidaria12@gmail.com )