The two incidents in India and Pakistan over the course of a week have shown that the coverage of terrorism by the Chinese media ecosystem largely reinforces the state’s foreign policy narratives and preferences for alignment in South Asia. Pakistan emerges as a clear preference for the public, which is reinforced by commentators and opinion makers on non-state news media platforms.
CPEC 2.0 is expected to serve as a major leverage tool for China to access Afghanistan’s untapped natural resources and enhance connectivity to Pakistan and Central Asia. However, for Afghanistan, the initiative may be more of a challenge than an opportunity. Countries such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives have already faced severe economic consequences from poorly structured Chinese-funded projects.
China's rise has, in the consensus view of most international relations scholars, fundamentally changed South Asia. The old, India-centric region is gone. Pakistan has tied its future to Beijing, seeing China as its ultimate guarantor. Bangladesh has played a smart game, using Chinese money for national development while maintaining its "friendship-to-all" foreign policy. The Teesta project shows Dhaka's new confidence in following its own national interest. For India, the challenge is immense, as it must now compete for influence in its own backyard.
India's increased naval exercises, combined with its Indo-Pacific ambitions and Western partnerships, indicate a shift from coastal defense to regional management. For smaller coastal states, such patterns can readily translate into worry, not from an impending threat, but from an inferred sense of power. When a major power operates near contested or shared spaces, the neighbors are obligated to interpret purpose through action.
Among other things, the bill, which is now an act, dismisses as inaccurate the Chinese claim that Tibet has been part of China since ancient times and empowers the State Department to actively counter China’s disinformation about Tibetan history, people and institutions.
The critical mineral supply chain in the Indo-Pacific is undergoing transformative changes through new deals, reforms, and negotiations facilitated by the strategic partnership of QUAD.
The belligerence by the PLA also exposes the futility of continuing Corps Commander-level military-to-military talks when China has repeatedly indicated there will be no more PLA pullback.
Beijing might still use this election victory for President Tsai as a pretext to increase aggression and to justify that peaceful reunification is a lost cause, portraying the DPP as the cause of increasing cross-Strait tensions.
As traditional geopolitics transforms, with the Gulf regaining centrality in the larger Indo-Pacific arena, India, Japan, and Southeast Asia see their strategic perspectives increasingly converge. The Big-B plan has significant implications for India, Bangladesh's Look East policy, and Thailand's Look West policy.
It would be prudent to establish a joint working mechanism with Myanmar at the diplomatic and military levels for managing the borders - unless we want China to keep winning.
China and Russia have shown their support for Myanmar despite the dire situation there, and their interest in the region is evident by their growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal.
As far as China is concerned, the so-called buffer zones are now a permanent arrangement and it knows India can do precious little about it. That is why China has been saying keep the border issue separate and get on with the bilateral relations.
Melaka is also seen as a possible counterbalancing base against potential power presence in the Nicobar Island chain in the Andaman Sea and as a fallback in complementing China's existing forward bases and port capacities in Gwadar in Pakistan and in linking up with the other routes in accessing the Indian Ocean.
The Indian government has no answer to the question that if we have not lost any territory, then why the 20 rounds of military-to-military talks?
The organisation of the Forum a few kilometres away from the eastern sector of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) not only signalled Beijing’s disregard for the LAC but also its attempt to buttress its claims over Arunachal as part of Tibet (Xizang) by selecting the venue of the international meeting in Nyingchi
The conflict of interest between India and China on the political front is likely to continue for a long time to come, with China’s territorial greed being what it is. However, business dealings between both countries must continue since such business is of mutual interest to both India and China.
India will do well to initiate the SWAMs and build a nuanced acoustic capacity and capability-building initiative nationally and at the regional level. The Security And Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) vision of India will be better served with an effective implementation of the UDA framework on the ground.
The debt phenomenon is so significant that nearly half the African Union member states are in debt – mostly to the state-owned banks of China. Countries in South America and Asia are also being caught up in this debt slide. While the New Delhi G20 summit only appealed to countries to address this serious debt issue, that China is now being seen as a part of the problem seems to be hanging over it like a Sword of Damocles.
Given the growing power differentials and China’s global hegemonic ambitions, it is observed that Xi attends mega events where his country has some clout and skips those that could put China in a tight spot and raise questions related to its accountability and responsibility.
