While Washington and New Delhi seek to strengthen bilateral ties with Colombo, Beijing has strategically engaged with the political forces that control the government. By engaging directly with actors at the core of Sri Lanka’s governance, Beijing appears to be signalling its strategic intent—projecting influence and reinforcing ideological ties.
Some analysts accuse the EU of double-standards arguing that the EU has been condemning Taliban policies since they assumed power, but were now holding direct discussions with them. Such meetings undermine the EU's credibility as a defender of human rights and democratic values.
Despite the narrative of the Pakistani state, Mahrang Baloch’s international recognition grew through 2024. Time magazine included her in its TIME100 Next list of emerging influential figures, citing her advocacy against enforced disappearances while the BBC named her to its 100 Women list.
Great powers realise the strategic value of small island states - refuelling facilities, logistics hubs, electronic listening posts, maritime surveillance nodes, diplomatic partnerships and access to vast EEZs. Their influence derives more from geographic position and political choice than from demographic size. Seychelles exemplifies this reality.
China in recent times has elevated some of its key bilateral relations, Vietnam, Pakistan, North Korea, to the level where they are now considered by Beijing as consequential to regional and global peace and stability. China’s foreign and 'grand strategy' is aimed at realizing a shared destiny for mankind and nurturing a new type of great-power relations within a multipolar world. This requires a strategic alignment between China’s strategy and others.
More importantly, the alleged sabotage occurred during a period of political transition following the developments of August 2024. Institutional loyalties, political rivalries, and competing networks of influence continue to shape Bangladesh's political landscape. In such a context, any breach involving the Prime Minister's secure communications infrastructure deserves careful examination.
India's MSME sector, the backbone of its export economy, remains largely unequipped to navigate European standards and certification requirements. As ABC Live noted, the next stage will be tougher than negotiation: India must now prove that its exporters, MSMEs, regulators, ports, testing labs, and state governments can actually use the agreement. A framework signed in Gothenburg means nothing to a textile exporter in Tiruppur who cannot get a product certified to EU standards.
The central lesson is simple: unresolved India-Pakistan hostility weakens South Asia from within. It prevents trade, blocks institutions, raises nuclear risk, politicizes water, militarizes borders, and diverts attention from human development. Both countries will continue to disagree on major issues. But disagreement does not require permanent hostility. Strategic maturity means building rules to manage conflict before conflict manages the region.
The Quad's Critical Minerals Initiative provides an important platform for achieving these objectives. Through coordinated investments, technology sharing and supply-chain diversification, the initiative seeks to create resilient and transparent mineral supply networks. Australia contributes abundant mineral reserves, Japan offers advanced processing technologies, the United States brings investment and innovation capabilities, while India provides a rapidly expanding market and growing manufacturing base.
Renewing the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty could also serve as an important confidence-building measure between Bangladesh and India. A renewed agreement would help restore mutual trust and strengthen regional cooperation over shared water resources. It would further reinforce the role of the Joint Rivers Commission (JRC), which remains a key institutional mechanism for addressing transboundary river issues.
By recognising Pakistan’s role in the Iran crisis, Brussels is signalling that influence in today's international system is increasingly distributed across multiple actors, not concentrated solely in Washington, Beijing, or Moscow. This fits with the EU’s broader effort to develop a more autonomous and flexible foreign policy in a more multipolar world.
China is a major defence exporter for Myanmar, but it has been arming both the Tatmadaw and the rebel forces. China’s aim is to secure its strategic highway through Myanmar to the Bay of Bengal and counter American and Indian influence in the region, including Myanmar and Bangladesh.
On all these fronts, the Quad is more consequential, based on geography, capability, necessity and the absence of any better alternative. AUKUS’ scope is seen as too narrow, while Camp David is too regional, and the Squad is too limited. Bilateral alliances are too fragmented, while the Quad is seen to have the scale, reach and flexibility to connect the Indian Ocean and Pacific theatres into one strategic framework
History offers a different lesson now: had India’s proposal been accepted, the war might have ended with far fewer casualties. Instead, the LTTE’s miscalculation culminated in Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination—driven by fears that his return to power would bring back the Indian Peace Keeping Force. The belief that opposing India could achieve a separate Tamil state proved catastrophic.
Trump’s demand for Pakistan to recognize Israel threatens to trigger serious domestic backlash inside the country. Public sentiment in Pakistan overwhelmingly supports the Palestinian cause, while religious and political groups strongly oppose normalization with Israel without the creation of an independent Palestinian state.
Chinese social media reactions to Rubio’s visit also reflected a degree of skepticism and criticism towards India. Several commentators focused on developmental and infrastructural contrasts between India and China. Discussions surrounding traffic congestion, pollution, aging infrastructure, and even the extreme summer temperatures in northern India were used by some online voices to project what they described as a “dismal” picture of India.
The Putin–Xi meeting, therefore, should not be interpreted as the birth of a fixed anti-American alliance. Rather, it reflects a flexible alignment whose cooperation is strongest where grievances overlap, but weakest where ambitions collide. Putin and Xi are united more by pressure than by trust. They are aligned in opposing American dominance, but not necessarily in supporting each other’s long-term rise.
Though with a Muslim population much larger than most of the OIC member countries, India has not been given its membership due to Pakistan’s objection and, unlike Russia, has not applied for observer status either. However, organisers of the KazanForum invited local Indian Consul General Jeysundkhar, who is based in Kazan, for the special session "Greater Eurasian Partnership: Development Strategy"
However, the visit clarified one important reality: despite periodic friction over trade, tariffs, Russia, immigration, or strategic autonomy, neither India nor the United States presently has the luxury of disengagement. The relationship may no longer carry the earlier romanticism of “natural allies,” but it continues to be driven by geopolitical realities - energy security, China’s rise, maritime stability, technology supply chains, and the changing balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.
