The emerging framework is likely to be more complex and less centralised. It may involve a mix of external partnerships, regional cooperation, and internal capacity building. It will also require a different mindset, one that accepts uncertainty as a constant factor.
This night was not about grandstanding; it was about results. Pakistan leveraged decades of ties with the U.S., deep cultural and geographic connections to Iran, and strong Gulf partnerships to create a channel no one else could. In an era of multipolar tensions, where flashpoints can ignite global crises, Islamabad showed it can convene, de-escalate, and deliver where others could not.
The unfolding conflict is not just a regional crisis. It is also putting the current global order under strain. Legal structures, economic systems and strategic alignments are all feeling this pressure. What we are seeing is not a clear collapse, but something more uncertain. Law is still in place, though its application varies. Interdependence continues, but it is increasingly used as leverage.There is no clearly defined alternative order ready to take the place of what is weakening
The most urgent and vital issue is the future management of the Strait of Hormuz. This narrow waterway supports a large part of the world’s energy supply. For many years, its security relied on Western naval dominance. That belief has now been challenged.Iran has demonstrated it can disrupt, threaten, and influence traffic through the Strait.
As Imran Khan enters his seventies behind bars, the stakes extend far beyond his individual fate. Should his detention continue—or worse, should harm befall him in custody—the consequences could be explosive. Public anger, already simmering, may erupt into widespread unrest, challenging the state’s ability to maintain control.
Bangladesh has survived partition, the liberation war, famine, floods, military coups, and democratic collapse. It has always returned. But returning is not the same as resolving. Fifty-six years after independence, the founding paradox remains: a nation whose birth is still debated cannot fully inhabit its future. The gun salutes will be loud and unambiguous. The questions they echo, however, about what Bangladesh is, who founded it, and whose vision should guide it, remain, as they have always been
For India, this raises complex challenges. Historically, India has positioned itself as a strong advocate of anti-colonialism and sovereignty. However, in the current context, its responses have often appeared measured and cautious, despite the direct implications for its interests—ranging from energy security and regional stability to strategic initiatives such as connectivity through Iran.
For India, the failure is particularly significant as its presidency was an opportunity to translate “strategic autonomy”, the current buzzword in foreign policy circles, into multilateral leadership. True, its response is shaped by structural constraints. The country imports more than 85% of its crude oil, much of it from West Asia and Russia. Some nine million of its citizens live in the Gulf. The United States is its largest trading partner. Iran anchors the Chabahar port project and India’s access to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Each relationship is too consequential to risk.
A key consideration for Delhi is Bhutan’s occasional denial or downplay of any Chinese encroachment on its territory, even when satellite data suggests otherwise. This is coupled with a growing perception within Bhutan that India is preventing it from completing its border negotiations with China. Although Thimphu remains closely aligned with Delhi, there is growing interest in expanding its engagement with China.
For India, the opportunity is significant as its robust digital infrastructure and large demographic dividend can create a significant opportunity for adoption and deployment of Artificial Intelligence across sectors, particularly in the care economy. There is an ample room for the development of age-friendly products and services using AI innovation which are of scalable commercial value.
South Asia's higher education ecosystem — with over 1,500 universities and 60 million enrolled learners — is uniquely positioned to absorb and scale new models: work-integrated degrees, on-demand micro-credentials, lifelong learning. The Global South — Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America, the Middle East — shares the same structural challenges. The solutions that work at scale in India, Bangladesh or Nepal will travel naturally to these geographies.
For three decades, Sri Lanka successfully navigated the India-China rivalry, turning great-power competition into economic opportunity. Today, the country faces a far narrower and more dangerous corridor. Balancing between India and China was a game of leverage. But, balancing between the United States-Israel axis and Iran is a test of survival.
India’s calibrated reopening to Chinese FDI is a step forward, but its restrictive framework may limit the inflow of capital, technology, and expertise needed to boost high-tech manufacturing. If the objective is to transform India into a global manufacturing hub and reduce the trade deficit with China, a more nuanced approach may be required—one that balances security concerns with economic imperatives.
What is unfolding across South Asia’s cities is not just an urban crisis, it is a reflection of deeper tensions within development itself. Growth is happening, but it is not translating into stability. Opportunities exist, but they are unevenly distributed. Systems are expanding, but not fast enough to keep up with demand. Cities, which have long been seen as places where people come to improve their lives, are increasingly becoming spaces where people struggle to sustain them.
South Asia’s tragedy is not geography or lack of industrial capacity. It is the failure to convert proximity into predictable partnerships. Trump’s tariff threats could remain episodic political theatre, or they could signal a more protectionist global environment. Either way, South Asia’s dependence on Western concessions exposes it to recurring uncertainty. Reviving SAFTA in spirit and substance would not eliminate trade with the West. It would diversify risk and embed value creation within the region.
The current war has exposed Bangladesh’s structural vulnerabilities: dependence on imported energy, fragile reserves, and narrow fiscal space. For the new government, the stakes are clear—stabilize fuel and food supplies now while building resilience through diversified energy, broader exports, and stronger social protection. Wars in the Gulf may be fought thousands of miles away, but their economic shockwaves reach Bangladesh within days. In the end, the crisis will be felt in three simple pressures shaping everyday life: oil prices, food costs, and migrant jobs.
This crisis did not emerge overnight. It is a product of neglecting the foundational capacity to invest in human capital, where Pakistan hardly puts less than 2% of its national GDP on human capital factors. Meanwhile, the regional peers like Bangladesh and India invest more in education and health, and Pakistan is still trapped in a cycle of short-term fiscal thinking, political instability, and elite capture that is systematically hollowing out the nation’s potential to rise and grow.
In 2026, the “strategic autonomy” that we so often discuss must evolve from a defensive crouch to a balanced offensive infrastructure play. India’s success will be measured by its ability to convince the Trump administration that a stable, digitally-sovereign BRICS is actually a better trade partner than a chaotic, bankrupt one.
Yunus created a suffocating atmosphere in Bangladesh by pushing the country towards the fate of a Caliphate, threatening the nation’s Bengali soul. Simultaneously, he weaponized the ICT and turned it into an instrument of targeting Sheikh Hasina by appointing Jamaat-e-Islami leaders into key positions in it. As a result, Hasina was handed death penalty in two cases, while she faces hundreds of murder charges—most of which were lodged by the activists of Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat.
