It is an elegantly worded statement and impossible to disprove. It turns a dispute about differing LAC perceptions, acknowledged since 1993, into a story of Chinese compliance and Indian deviation. This is the new China that India must manage, not the old one.
India achieved this in a group that has changed a great deal. BRICS now has 11 members and 10 partner countries, with very different political systems and, at times, sharply different views. In May 2026, a meeting of BRICS foreign ministers in New Delhi ended without a joint statement because of differences among members over the conflict in West Asia.
We must approach peace in the same way: One school screening, one honest history lesson, one interfaith friendship, one community conversation, and one courageous act at a time. We cannot change the past, but we can decide what we pass on to the next generation
The Maldives, like other small states, has an interest in diversifying its international partnerships, widening its economic choices and retaining room for diplomatic manoeuvre. Engagement with Pakistan does not necessarily come at India's expense
Amid concerns regarding U.S. reliability on trade and defence commitments under the current White House, both India and Japan are leaning on each other to build supply chain and economic resilience—acting as a pragmatic "middle power" buffer rather than purely relying on Washington.
For decades, Europe generally followed Washington when American and European strategic interests broadly coincided. Iran exposes what happens when they do not. Europe still needs the United States for security—but increasingly wants to retain the right to say: “We share your objective, but we do not necessarily accept your method.”
Rather than relying solely on high-level political rhetoric, India can employ a combination of economic diplomacy, institutional de-escalation, water-sharing agreements, and people-to-people engagement to rebuild trust and stabilize relations with Bangladesh.
The Wakhan Corridor has become a possible trade road for China's economic expansion. The corridor provides China with strategic advantages. First, it offers potential overland access to Afghanistan and on to Pakistan and the Arabian Sea
Before the mid-2020s, Iran lacked the specific low-cost tactical capability (drones, missiles and tech int) required to hold SoH against the US military. Today, the newly acquired capabilities allow Iran to enforce an effective, sustainable, and lethal denial-of-access corridor at a much lower cost.
China’s growing influence on small countries thus extends far beyond trade and infrastructure. It shapes debates on governance, challenges democratic norms, and pressures sovereign states to align with Beijing’s priorities. For nations like Sri Lanka and Nepal, the dilemma is stark
Here is something that is perhaps not widely reported. According to this account, Iranian forces were able to destroy a significant part of the logistics infrastructure supporting these large carrier operations. They struck the central logistics hub in Bahrain very early in the conflict.
Bangladesh's Prime Minister need not visit India simply to keep relations cordial, but when engagement can advance its interests, refusing engagement becomes a cost of its own. The objective should be to preserve leverage through engagement, not to mistake rigidity for leverage.
However, the political situation has gradually begun to show currents that may move against Munir. The Supreme Court of Pakistan’s order to shift former Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan, Munir’s arch-rival, to a private hospital and the statement by the US Ambassador to India, Sergio Gor affirming that J&K is "an important part of India", reinforces the impression of classic temporariness and limited strategic relevance of Pakistan in US-Pak relations.
New Delhi’s official response has been measured, almost pointedly so, a statement that India is “looking into the implications” rather than any dramatic condemnation. That restraint is wise, and should be read as strength rather than uncertainty. India’s ties with Saudi Arabia are too economically consequential, too carefully cultivated over the past decade, for Riyadh to jeopardize them by handing Pakistan a blank check.
The vulnerability for India lies in the asymmetry of technological readiness and the aggressive sub-surface mapping being conducted by external actors, most notably China. Beijing has been able to resource its scientific research vessels, oceanographic mapping devices, and supposed civilian ocean surveys to map the bathymetry and mineral content of the Indian Ocean Region systematically.
China’s growing influence in Sri Lanka is an immediate concern for India as the resident power in the region, but it is also a global concern for the United States.
The Indian government is caught in a bind. Despite the BNP government’s outrage, for Delhi to hasten Hasina’s extradition is not an option.
The borderland TTP now exploits is the same terrain that Pakistan's own security establishment worked for decades to create as "strategic depth." The world of proxy-war infrastructure seldom remains directed towards where its architects have aimed.
A significant factor that emerged after India launched Operation Sindoor against Pakistan in May 2025 was the strain in the India-US relationship under the Trump administration, driven by aggressive tariff disputes and policy friction. This indirectly accelerated India’s push to diversify partnerships, prompting New Delhi to lean more pragmatically into closer economic and strategic ties with middle powers such as Australia.
