For example, the recent recruitment drive for thousands of home-based caregiver positions in Israel, promoted by the Labour, Employment, Skill Development and Entrepreneurship Department of the Mizoram state government in northeastern India, was a striking example of institutionalised labour diplomacy. The advertisement clearly outlined the eligibility criteria, certification requirements and employment terms.  Such initiatives would prove essential for state accountability and worker protection in the international political and legal arena.

India today sits at the bottom of the rank of countries in the Environmental Performance Index (EPI), which combines a range of indicators like climate change mitigation, air pollution, waste management, sustainability of fisheries and agriculture, deforestation, and biodiversity protection. The EPI is produced by centres working under Yale and Columbia universities. The 2024 listing showed India at rank 176 out of 180, just ahead of Pakistan (rank 179) but behind Bangladesh (175), China (156), and Sri Lanka (134).

Overall, 2025 was a tough year for India’s foreign policy with choices being curtailed and by the end of the year India’s foreign policy once again appears to be driven more by constraints, opportunities and choices.

Through vulnerability analytics, AI can highlight populations more likely to struggle with recovery, including plantation communities, low-income families, and settlements located on flood plains. India has already allocated a US$450 million fund for Sri Lanka’s post-cyclone recovery. The joint committee established by India and Sri Lanka to manage this fund will be able to implement AI-based disaster warning systems under Sri Lanka’s digitalisation programme, which is being supported by India.

For now, Rahman’s return is a consequential fact: it reshapes domestic dynamics and reframes the bilateral conversation at a critical moment in Bangladesh’s political calendar. If New Delhi reciprocates with measured outreach, this moment can be converted into durable, institutionalized cooperation.

Yunus’s actions increasingly reflect the anti-India agenda of pro-Pakistan fundamentalists. This is illustrated by a book he recently presented to a visiting Canadian delegation - its cover featured a map of Bangladesh appearing to encompass large parts of India’s northeast—a symbolic gesture aimed at globalising the anti-India narrative.

At this critical juncture, developing countries such as India need to forge alliances to rescue multilateral trade. This would require a vociferous championing of multilateral trade at all forums and the use of all means to challenge American unilateralism. Sadly, India has not done much in this regard. 

Has India faltered in “handling” these two neighbours? In theory, perhaps. As the dominant regional power, expectations are inevitably high. In practice, however, India’s very dominance generates suspicion in both Pakistan and Bangladesh, sharply limiting its influence. Meanwhile, the United States, with its strategic weight, and China with its economic clout, have exercised far greater leverage over Pakistan for decades. A similar dynamic applies to Bangladesh. 

Moderator Khushi Kabir repeatedly situated Nepal’s uprising within a broader South Asian context, drawing parallels with recent mass movements in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. She described Nepal’s experience as part of a regional reckoning driven by youth demanding accountability, dignity, and meaningful participation in governance.

With PNS Khaibar's delivery Pakistan and Türkiye are taking their relationship to a new level which is not limited to traditional political friendship. At the handover ceremony, Erdoğan described the relationship between the countries as "brotherly ties" and emphasised the need to further collaborate in defence production. The naval leadership of Pakistan also pointed to the fact that the partnership should benefit Pakistan in achieving its overall maritime modernisation.

What is unfolding in Bangladesh bears unsettling resemblance to trajectories seen in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where false blasphemy accusations have long been used to terrorize minorities and silence dissent. Once such violence is tolerated, it expands - devouring journalists, artists, reformist Muslims, and eventually the state itself.

The current strains in Bangladesh–India relations should therefore be seen not as an inevitable deterioration, but as a test of diplomatic maturity. Bangladesh and India share more than geography and history; they share a responsibility to ensure that temporary political frictions do not harden into structural mistrust. In a time of regional uncertainty, neither country benefits from a relationship defined by grievance or miscommunication. 

The 27th Amendment, celebrated by its proponents as a security reform, is in reality a political coup executed through constitutional means. It marks not only Munir’s personal triumph but the institutional victory of the military over all other state authorities. As history warns, empowering any unelected institution above the republic’s elected will invites instability—not strength. Pakistan may soon discover that consolidating military power does not secure the nation’s future, but instead places it at greater risk

India must now transition from conventional soft-power thinking to visibility governance—the systematic management of how the country appears, circulates, and is emotionally interpreted across global platforms. Failure to do so will leave India’s global image increasingly shaped by commercial incentives outside Indian control.  

The strengthening of Taliban-India ties runs counter to Pakistan’s interests. The more border clashes intensify between the Taliban and Pakistan, the more secure the Kashmir region and the Line of Control (LoC) become for India. Under such conditions, Pakistan will remain preoccupied with its northwestern border, giving India a unique opportunity to consolidate its control over Kashmir and potentially weaken, drive out, or eliminate Kashmiri militant groups