The current strains in Bangladesh–India relations should therefore be seen not as an inevitable deterioration, but as a test of diplomatic maturity. Bangladesh and India share more than geography and history; they share a responsibility to ensure that temporary political frictions do not harden into structural mistrust. In a time of regional uncertainty, neither country benefits from a relationship defined by grievance or miscommunication.
The 27th Amendment, celebrated by its proponents as a security reform, is in reality a political coup executed through constitutional means. It marks not only Munir’s personal triumph but the institutional victory of the military over all other state authorities. As history warns, empowering any unelected institution above the republic’s elected will invites instability—not strength. Pakistan may soon discover that consolidating military power does not secure the nation’s future, but instead places it at greater risk
India must now transition from conventional soft-power thinking to visibility governance—the systematic management of how the country appears, circulates, and is emotionally interpreted across global platforms. Failure to do so will leave India’s global image increasingly shaped by commercial incentives outside Indian control.
The strengthening of Taliban-India ties runs counter to Pakistan’s interests. The more border clashes intensify between the Taliban and Pakistan, the more secure the Kashmir region and the Line of Control (LoC) become for India. Under such conditions, Pakistan will remain preoccupied with its northwestern border, giving India a unique opportunity to consolidate its control over Kashmir and potentially weaken, drive out, or eliminate Kashmiri militant groups
Championing a rules-based maritime order in the Indian Ocean, which Sri Lanka has long called for since its 1971 ‘Indian Ocean Peace Zone’ (IOPZ) proposal and ensuring strict adherence to the provisions of the ‘UN Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (UNCLOS), will reinforce Sri Lanka’s credibility and also encourage cooperative stability in the Indian Ocean.
For Modi, the political cost of appearing to bow to American pressure may be almost as high as the economic cost of resisting it. In the end, the tariffs are not just about commerce. They are a test of whether India can still straddle the fault lines of great-power rivalry—whether the world’s most populous democracy is being forced into the uncomfortable role of choosing sides.
With the Ukraine war and the resulting sanctions making it difficult for Russia to trade with its allies, being barred from using SWIFT or the US dollar, it resulted in Russia resorting to local currencies to trade that resulted in the BRICS currency drawing adverse attention in Washington and gaining global imprtance.
In the end, Yunus may find that his greatest failure is not the scandals that have already emerged, but the corrosion of hope that followed him into office. A nation that once believed it had found a principled steward now sees another operator in the same tired political theater—just with better English and a Nobel medal.
The most probable outcome in Tianjin is what one Indian diplomat called a “tactical pause.” A cooling of tensions, a resumption of some economic and security dialogues, perhaps even a roadmap for regular high-level contact. That would be enough to stabilise the border and signal to Washington that India has options.
India is a responsible nuclear power, the world’s fastest-growing major economy, and a civilisation-state that does not live on borrowed credibility. It has the patience to navigate provocation and the capacity to respond decisively. If Pakistan’s military flirts with Armageddon, India will respond “BrahMostically” with unmatched precision and power.
Whether dominated by China's singular might, led by India's democratic coalition, or governed through shared stewardship, the path Asia takes by 2050 will profoundly influence the global balance of power, ethical governance, and economic prosperity. India's role, whether as counterweight or partner to China, will be critical.
A seminal 2020 study by Das and Talukdar outlines the socio-economic and political consequences of this migration. The authors note that the influx, particularly post-1971, has led to widespread fear among Assamese communities about becoming minorities in their own homeland. Migration has altered landholding patterns, changed linguistic profiles, and generated social unrest.
With the steady return of Chinese tourists as well as expanding trade, China’s growing commercial footprint in Nepal is forcing Kathmandu to search for balance and sustainability in its economic engagement with China. It will also perhaps move India to compete more selectively to secure its commercial presence in the face of a resurgent Chinese involvement.
India should reiterate its strategic autonomy publicly while making clear that it views strong ties with the US as vital. India insists its oil purchases from Russia are driven by economic necessity, not geopolitics, while questioning US-EU hypocrisy on Russia sanctions. Counter Trump's alignment with Pakistan and inflammatory rhetoric by highlighting India’s reliability as a global partner and democratic ally in the Indo‑Pacific.
The unintended winner in this drama may well be China. Not just because Modi plans to travel to Beijing. If the trade standoff continues, Indian exporters—particularly in labor-intensive sectors like textiles, pharmaceuticals, electronics, and jewelry—will lose market share to Chinese and Vietnamese rivals, not to speak of South Asian rivals like Bangladesh and Pakistan, at least on textiles.
India has many of the core ingredients necessary for AI leadership: A large and growing pool of STEM graduates (over one million annually). Pioneering digital public infrastructure, including Aadhaar, UPI, and CoWIN.Rich linguistic and cultural diversity to train context-sensitive, globally adaptable AI models.
In the light of his calculated avoidance of any media interaction in the last 11 years, it is unlikely that he would be asked what he meant by “personal price”. For a prime minister to say something that serious in such categorical terms requires attention. Conversely, it may just be in keeping with his penchant for political theater to keep his opponents and supporters guessing what he meant.
According to the World Inequality Lab, the top 1% own over 40% of India's total wealth. The starkness of this trend is apparent: a "rising India" for a few, but ongoing deprivation for the majority.
Which is why, the recent attacks on the ancestral homes of Tagore and Satyajit Ray, who are Indian but are also both global icons of Bengali culture, indicate considerable confusion in the thinking that is guiding Bangladesh policy since Hasina fled Dhaka. Has Islam and the Islamic identity subsumed the Bengali identity and culture of Bangladesh?
