India's rural self-government institutions: Issues of funds, federalism and functionalities

Separation of powers, and federalism comprise the basic structure of the constitution, and long-drawn executive and legislative steps are needed to dispose of legislative actions and decisions that circumvent them

Anushka Saxena Jun 04, 2021
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India's rural self-government

Famously, India is the largest democracy in the world, with a unique federal structure that best works for itself. But the provisions of federalism and separation of powers our constitution offers can be put to better use today.  Last week, a taluk (block or intermediate level rural body) in the Kalaburagi (also known as Gulbarga) city of Karnataka faced a shortage - not of ventilators - but of specialists who could install and utilize them efficiently. 

As many as 25 ventilators lay unused in the taluk’s hospital, and in the absence of doctors or technicians who could work them, they were as good as useless. This case represents larger problems within the capacity of our Panchayati Raj Institutions (rural self-governing bodies)  to operate, and these problems are represented by the 4Fs - funds, functions, functionaries and functionalities.

The availability of resources accompanied by a lack of skilled and trained “functionaries” is a significant shortcoming at all levels of PRIs. Similarly, the lack of “funds”, the freedom to perform “functions” by making laws and the inability to perform whatever tasks are attributed “functionally,” broadly define both, the barriers facing an efficient PRI system in India, as well as the potential solutions moving forward.

Panchayat funding 

To begin with, the issue concerning the funding of panchayats is a major one. As per the provisions of Article 243I of the Indian Constitution, each state government is meant to appoint a State Finance Commission (SFC) every five years to review the financial position of the PRIs in the state. The SFC recommends to the state legislatures what grants or funds can be given to panchayats, or what powers can be given to them in terms of tax collection. While this means that funding of PRIs is completely at the mercy of the states, it also means the ideals of federalism can be circumvented here. 

We have seen during the pandemic in 2020 how states have been under duress when their ability to make decisions on lockdowns or to raise funds was overwhelmed due to the decisions of the central government. We also saw that while Prime Minister Narendra Modi's Atmanirbhar Bharat package allotted a whopping Rs 2 million crore (USD 2,74,32,70,00,000)  to various sectors of the Indian economy, the provisions made for states to borrow were based on certain mandatory conditions that were difficult to fulfill in the limited time they had (such as the implementation of 'One Nation, One Ration Card’ and Ease of Doing business reforms). 

Of course, many states did become eligible for increased borrowing after implementing required reforms, and the reforms themselves may be of great relevance and benefit in the coming years, but it makes us question the need for certain compulsions that were placed on the states in times that were, and continue to be, dire. 

Similarly, when it comes to PRIs, states are either hesitant to divert funds as per the needs and requirements of the institutions, or they even refuse to constitute the SFC. It is a constitutional body that should have been serving its sixth term in all states today (since SFCs were first constituted in 1993), but in most states, they’re only serving their second or third terms.

Devolution of powers

Another cause of concern, linking both funds, functionaries and functions, is that of parallel running schemes and tied-up funds. Every year, the government presents to parliament various amounts of funds allotted to PRIs. However, these funds are only scheme-related, and not directed to the functionaries of the PRIs themselves. This, in turn, causes the PRIs to function at low capacity since they are only seen as a medium for the implementation of state or center-sponsored schemes, but not as their own decision-makers and implementors. 

There also exist schemes like Members of Parliament Local Area Development Scheme (MPLADS) or Member of Legislative Assembly Area Development Schemes (MLAADS), that provide MPs and MLAs (respectively) with funds to constitute assets for local growth, as well as bodies like the District Rural Development Agency, to oversee poverty alleviation in rural areas. Since these schemes and bodies run on the same lines of work as those that should ideally be allotted to PRIs, it is necessary that they be abolished for serious action to be taken towards the devolution of powers.

Finally, the issues of devolution of power come to light with the question of federalism. States are often hesitant to even constitute PRIs, let alone devolve powers to them, for various understandable political reasons. 

In Karnataka itself, the state government had once sued its own State Election Commissioner for setting a date for holding panchayat elections. The government argued they would be unable to conduct elections at that time as the matrix for constituencies to be reserved for SC/ST candidates was not ready. The High Court did rule in favor of holding the elections based on the previous electoral matrix, but it has made room for governments to apply caution and political pressure in terms of choosing pliable Election commissioners now, thereby making the PRI election process more difficult. 

Moreover, since the devolution of powers to PRIs in the 29 areas listed under Schedule XI of the Indian Constitution is optional for states, they do not care to indulge in it.

Need for reforms

Solutions require great political will, long-term planning. Firstly, parallel programs and schemes need to be abolished, and their funds and resources must be given to those on the ground, directly elected by the people. Apart from that, there is a need to establish skill-development courses for functionaries of the panchayat system, and construct institutional structures like buildings to conduct them in. Constitutional amendments must make both the election of PRIs as well as devolution of powers mandatory. 

As per recommendations of the second Administrative Reforms Commission, two other major reforms must be in order - firstly, each state must constitute a State Legislative Council, and more than 1/3rd of its members should be nominated by PRIs/ municipal bodies so that local government institutions have a voice in the state legislature. Secondly, states must attach action taken reports along with reports of the SFCs, when tabled in the state legislature, so that we are aware of what actions have states taken, or why they haven’t taken an action on any recommendation of the SFC with regards to the funding of the PRIs.

Separation of powers, and federalism comprise the basic structure of the constitution, and long-drawn executive and legislative steps are needed to dispose of legislative actions and decisions that circumvent them.

(The writer is an undergraduate student of History at Lady Shri Ram College for Women, University of Delhi. She can be contacted at anushkasaxenalsr@gmail.com. She tweets @Saxenaanushka) 

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