Great powers realise the strategic value of small island states - refuelling facilities, logistics hubs, electronic listening posts, maritime surveillance nodes, diplomatic partnerships and access to vast EEZs. Their influence derives more from geographic position and political choice than from demographic size. Seychelles exemplifies this reality.

The unprecedented scale of China's nuclear infrastructure build-up increasingly raises questions about whether this represents strategic balance or strategic hypocrisy. As Beijing's capabilities grow, so too will international scrutiny of the widening gap between its disarmament discourse and its nuclear realities.

A military confrontation in the Gulf can raise food prices in South Asia, accelerate inflation in Africa, disrupt supply chains in Europe, and unsettle financial markets across the globe. The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz is therefore more than a maritime development; it is a reminder of the profound interdependence that defines the contemporary international order.

The controversy surrounding the proposed Lord Ram statue has emerged at a time when the BNP government has been in office for only 100 days. Some political observers believe that certain groups may be attempting to exploit the issue to deepen existing tensions between Bangladesh and India 

Every democracy permits foreign funding under regulated conditions. The question is whether democratic states possess adequate mechanisms to ensure transparency, accountability and protection against external influence operations, which could be against core national interests.

Over the past two months, a series of alleged push-in incidents along the Bangladesh-India border has reportedly left scores of people stranded in zero-line and no-man's-land areas under difficult conditions.

The central message at the Shangri-La Dialogue is that America is staying, but on new terms. It will remain the core military balancer in the Indo-Pacific, but it expects allies and partners to become serious contributors. The era of strategic free-riding is ending. The new Indo-Pacific order will increasingly be defined by those willing and able to share the burden of preserving it.

The CEPS conference shows Pakistan is shifting the Indus issue from technical water management  to geopolitical norm contest. That’s the key transition. Once a river dispute enters Brussels policy networks, international arbitration, climate diplomacy, and security discourse it becomes much harder to keep it bilateral. And that is likely Pakistan’s main strategic objective. 

The Islamabad Memorandum has bought time. But time is not neutral. It can be used to construct a more durable settlement, or by spoilers in Washington, Tehran and Tel Aviv to rebuild the case for war. The ceasefire will endure only if the difficult questions postponed in Islamabad are answered before those who opposed the truce succeed in answering them on the battlefield.

A big development happened in 2025. Nepal started exporting electricity to Bangladesh through India's transmission network. This was the first time Nepalese hydropower was commercially transmitted to Bangladesh via Indian territory. The initial export volume was 40 megawatts. The significance of the agreement is much bigger. It showed that regional energy cooperation can overcome political barriers.  

India's rise as a major global power will depend not on the promises of allies or the intentions of adversaries but on its capacity to build economic strength, military capability, technological innovation, and strategic resilience. Partnerships will remain important. Cooperation will remain valuable. Engagement with the United States and other powers will continue to serve Indian interests. But the foundation of India's security cannot rest in Washington, Moscow, Beijing, or any other foreign capital.

However, evolving regional dynamics, particularly China’s expansion and Pakistan’s tactical nuclear developments, continue to test the durability and interpretation of this doctrine. While India has officially reiterated its commitment to No First Use, debates persist within strategic circles about its future applicability under extreme scenarios.

The significance of Shisir Khanal’s visit therefore lies not only in the agreements reached but in the broader message it conveyed. Both Kathmandu and New Delhi are signalling a willingness to move beyond the grievances and suspicions that have periodically defined their interactions. If the emphasis on development diplomacy, economic integration, and pragmatic cooperation is sustained, the current moment could indeed mark the beginning of a new chapter in India–Nepal relations.

This is also the terrain through which the US 62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) traverses, facing security threats from north to south, losing men and material in attacks by militants. That being the case, the US entry brings in another global player, ready to guard its interests against China’s looming presence. Is the South Asian region headed for a proxy war? 

This contradiction—peace abroad, repression at home—defines Pakistan’s current posture. While Islamabad seeks international recognition as a mediator, its domestic record is marred by bloodshed and denial of democracy. The JAAC movement, rooted in basic economic grievances, has become a symbol of resistance against this hypocrisy.