Samurdhi’s community-based banking system provides a foundation in Sri Lanka through savings, member participation and livelihood support. Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank offers useful lessons in lending without conventional collateral, organising small borrower groups and placing women at the centre of financial participation.
The October 2026 IMF WEO projections show that South Asia's growth prospects do not follow a uniform pattern. These differences are not a reason to abandon regional cooperation, but rather a basis for strengthening more inclusive and productive integration mechanisms.
India may not match the United States or China in total refining capacity, but its sophisticated refining infrastructure, crude-processing flexibility, and export capability give it an important place in the global energy system.
Remittances have become an unusually large source of external finance for South Asia. But a development model in which workers migrate because domestic employment is inadequate, and then send income home to support domestic consumption, cannot indefinitely substitute for creating productive employment at home.
Neutrality and balance — Colombo’s habitual vocabulary — have yielded little economic benefit. Ultimately, Sri Lanka slid into bankruptcy. Given this background, the land link is not merely a strategic starting point but a necessity. India’s strategic position on Sri Lanka is perennial; whether the bridge is built or not, India’s concerns remain fundamental. As an immediate neighbour and rising global power, India will not allow rivals to use Sri Lanka as a base.
Increased industrial activity in India could generate demand for raw materials, intermediate goods, and services from countries such as Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Bangladesh’s textile industry could strengthen its links with Indian manufacturing networks, while Sri Lanka may gain from expanded opportunities in tourism, logistics, and services.
ADB’s role has evolved beyond financing into shaping India’s structural transformation into a high-growth, technology-driven, and climate-conscious economy. Compared to other multilateral institutions, it offers a more agile, implementation-focused, and regionally attuned approach. As India moves toward becoming one of the world’s largest economies, this partnership will play a defining role in shaping not only India’s growth trajectory but also the broader economic future of Asia.
The days of “benign neglect” of our exchange rate policy are over. Nepal’s macroeconomic fundamentals — record reserves, stable remittance inflows, a gradually diversifying trade base — have quietly put in place the foundation for reform. What is missing is the political will to act on it.
This is why citrus should not be treated as a narrow commodity issue. It reveals a larger problem in India’s agricultural development model. India wants to move from being a large producer to becoming a reliable supplier in high-value agricultural trade. But that transition cannot happen through production alone. It requires farm-to-port systems designed around perishability.
The Andaman and Nicobar Islands offer a natural strategic advantage. Often described as “unsinkable aircraft carriers,” they provide an ideal platform for surveillance, deterrence, and force projection across the Bay of Bengal and beyond. With modern aircraft, naval assets, and refuelling capabilities, India can monitor vast maritime spaces from these islands.
The exit suits the relative aspirations of both nations. UAE with its world-class port infrastructure, financial centers, and geographical position linking Asia, Africa, and Europe, is uniquely positioned to give a push to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This newfound independence of UAE makes it a perfect match for China’s preference for flexible bilateral relations over the rigid multilateral regional forums.
Myanmar’s unfolding reality demands a fundamental shift in how it is perceived and addressed by the international community. Treating the country as a unified state under a single authority is no longer tenable, and policies built on that assumption will continue to fall short. The challenge now lies in adapting to a fragmented political order while seeking pathways toward stability and eventual reconciliation.
The external support by China and Russia lent support to the Tatmadaw, especially during the elections, and while ASEAN and western powers have refused to accept the legitimacy of the election, many of the immediate neighbours like India, Bangladesh, and Thailand prefer what they see as stability under the military, given their cross-border concerns.
At a time when global consumers are increasingly drawn to wellness-oriented and sustainable diets, South Asian culinary traditions, particularly those rooted in India’s Ayurveda, offer significant potential. However, without institutional backing, this remains diffused cultural capital rather than strategic influence.
The China tale offers important lessons. China’s rise in the renewable sector is not just fuelled by demand for clean energy, but by a broader strategy, linking energy policy with manufacturing, technology development and global trade. India now seems to have begun taking steps in this direction. Policy measures such as the production-linked incentives scheme for solar manufacturing and efforts to expand domestic battery production are intended to strengthen the country’s clean energy ecosystem.
China’s expanding influence in Myanmar and Bangladesh does not operate in isolation. It is reinforced by Beijing’s long-standing strategic partnership with Pakistan, frequently described by both sides as an “all-weather” alliance. In recent years, Islamabad has sought to revive and expand diplomatic engagement with both Dhaka and Naypyidaw, reflecting a broader effort to re-establish its presence along the eastern arc of the Bay of Bengal. While Pakistan lacks China’s financial scale or infrastructure capacity, its diplomatic signalling complements Beijing’s presence
Officially, India maintained that no territory was lost. Strategically, however, many analysts described the situation as a shift in the status quo—an altered operational environment in which access, patrolling patterns and tactical depth were recalibrated.
India’s rise coincides with China’s structural slowdown, reshaping Asia’s strategic landscape. For Malaysia, the choice is not between India and others—but between preparing early for India’s ascent or adjusting late. Prime Minister Modi’s visit represents a strategic inflection point. Deepening ties in defence, technology, semiconductors, energy, food security, education, and culture is not merely prudent—it is foundational to Malaysia’s long-term prosperity, security, and strategic autonomy.
But in NSS 2025 the specific reference to the “Quad” appears less central as compared to its 2022 prominence. The document emphasized the allies assuming primary responsibility for their own region even as it identified the Indo-Pacific as a key economic and geopolitical battleground. It reiterates that alliances and strengthening partnerships “will be the bedrock of security and prosperity long into the future”
